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Abstract 
The parliamentary immunity as an ensemble of legal provisions, ensures for the deputies and the senators a derogatory juridical 
system from the common law, in relation to the justice and with the purpose of guaranteeing their independence. The protection 
that is being offered to the members of the Parliament against potential abuses from the executive power is a relative, not an 
absolute one. Thus, immunity does not imply impunity. In accordance with the principles of a democratic state, it is necessary 
that an adequate protection is offered to the deputies and senators, precisely so that a situation would not arise, in which they are 
prevented from exercising their mandate according to their own convictions, as a consequence of political disputes or personal 
vendettas. 
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1. Introductory Elements 
Due to the current social background, in which the influences of the political aspects are more and more visible in 
all fields of activity, we consider it useful to analyze in minute detail the organ of immunity, bearing in mind the fact 
that in this respect there are two opposite general opinions. On one hand, there are voices that claim the removal of 
this protection conferred to the parliamentarians, supporting the fact that this privilege is unjustified, and on the other 
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hand, there are opinions which claim the consolidation of the warranties offered to the political representatives, in 
order to avoid the situation in which a deputy or a senator can not perform his mandate because of abuses of any 
kind. 
The specialized literature (Deleanu, 2006, p. 69) states that according to new European democracies, the state 
subject to the rule of law is a necessary, useful and mythical reason who supported the idea of the human rights and 
freedoms as being the most powerful in the state. Among these rights there is the right of every citizen to choose, 
this being a proof of the statehood of the peoples. 
Naming a representative means in fact agreeing on a convention between the ones who choose and the ones who 
wish to obtain the status of parliamentarian, this power being conferred in order for the latter to represent the rights 
and interests of the private parties, and to have their voice heard at the hierarchic level. 
Given these conditions, the confidence vote with which the people’s representatives are endowed, bears a few 
obligations on their behalf, which are established by means of fundamental law. In order to have a justified balance 
in performing the mandate and to not interfere in an abusive manner, the procurator obtains a special status which 
confers to him some types of warranties. One of these warranties is called parliamentary immunity, which consists of 
an ensemble of legal provisions, that ensures for the deputies and the senators a derogatory juridical system from the 
common law, in relation to the justice and with the purpose of guaranteeing their independence.  
This institution, as per the specialized literature (Iancu, 2007, p. 489), “aims at protecting the parliamentarian 
from abusive or tormenting judicial follow-ups, and not at removing the parliamentarian’s responsibility. There are 
two categories of parliamentary immunities: the inexistence of responsibility (irresponsibility), which concerns the 
legal activity of performing the mandate of the parliamentarian (discourses, opinions, votes) and the inviolability, 
which comprises special rules with regards to the perquisition and arresting of the senators or deputies. 
The localization of the rules in case of these types of immunities is to be found in art. 72 of the Romanian 
Constitution: “The deputies and senators cannot be made responsible for the votes or political opinions expressed 
while performing the mandate. The deputies and senators can be subjected to follow-ups and trials for deeds that 
don’t have any connection to votes or political opinions expressed while performing the mandate, but can not be 
searched or arrested without the prior agreement with the Chamber to which they are submitted after intercepting 
them. The follow-up and trial can be performed only by the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice. The competence of arguing belongs to the High Court of Cassation and Justice.” 
In this respect we notice that the protection conferred to the members of the Parliament against abusive uses of 
power is relative and not absolute, because the immunity doesn’t also include impunity. 
Analyzing both forms of parliamentary immunity, we notice that the notion of irresponsibility was defined by the 
specialized literature (Danisor, 2007, p. 353) as being an essential rule of the representative democratic regime, 
which brings into discussion the fact that the senators and deputies cannot be brought to book for votes or political 
opinions expressed while performing the mandate. 
Being a constitutional institution, the irresponsibility is maintained even after the mandate is over, its reason for 
existing being the interest of the wellbeing of the Parliament and not the personal interest of the chosen candidate, as 
a person. 
As opposed to irresponsibility, inviolability - the second form of immunity is included in art. 72 of the 
Constitution and maintains that the senators and deputies be followed-up for deeds that don’t have any connection to 
votes or political opinions expressed while performing the mandate, but can not be searched or arrested without the 
prior agreement with the Chamber to which they are submitted after intercepting them. This is a so-called formal 
immunity, as per specialized literature claims (Gilia, 2009, p. 170, Turianu, 2012, p. 1) and it is connected 
exclusively to criminal responsibility. It protects the mandate and the parliamentarian against the prospects of 
repressive or abusive follow-ups, inspired by presumed political reasons or personal vendetta, pressures, plots for 
actions outside the mandate. 
We notice that the inviolability has as main purpose the protection of the parliamentarian in what concerns his 
actions with regards to deeds that do not have any connection to the direct performance of the mandate. 
We adhere to the opinion (Muraru and Tanasescu, 2006, p. 190) according to which the parliamentary immunity is 
some sort of juridical warranty for the undisturbed performance of the activities of senators and deputies. It must not 
be interpreted as the removal of responsibilities of senators and deputies for not obeying to the laws, but as a 
protection against possible abuses or pressures, this protection being so necessary from the point of view of a 
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democratic system. 
As opposed to other forms of immunities, we notice that the inviolability refers to a set of warranties which 
confer stability and security during the performed mandate. 
2. Arguments with Regards to the Removal of Protection Conferred to Parliamentarians 
Even though we reckon that restraining immunities would be a step forward against corruption, removing this 
form of protection doesn’t but submit the legislative representatives to the executive power, making them more 
vulnerable to some abuses.  
We support the fact that the institution of parliamentary immunity is perceived erroneously by the public 
opinion, because the tendency is to eliminate this institution as a whole. The specialized literature (Turianu, 2012, p. 
1) claims that there is a visible discrepancy between the theoretical concept of “parliamentary immunity” and the 
actual  way in which this institution is applied in practice. 
Generally speaking, the tendency to restrain the protection to which the representatives of the Parliament are 
submitted was considered to be in response to the widely spread concept according to which the parliamentary 
immunities are nothing more than unjustified privileges which are awarded to the elected ones, and even a way of 
eliminating the law. 
The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Political Regime and Constitutional Regime of Romania, in 
the activity report required by the President of Romania (The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the 
Political Regime and Constitutional Regime of Romania, pp. 24-25) argued that : “The Parliamentarians view the 
parliamentary immunity as a check in blank, designed to offer the premises of the birth of a cast of citizens who 
don’t benefit from a position of impunity and intangibility. The natural protection from the executive powers is 
converted to the argument that justifies the appearance of criminal and procedural privileges”. 
In this respect, the specialized literature (Popescu, 2011, p. 23) states that the individual political responsibility 
was adsorbed by the criminal responsibility of the elected, which in its turn was proved to be inefficient, because of 
the parliamentary immunity. Consequently, in most of the European states, in order to gross the political legitimacy 
of the representatives and improve their responsibility, the institution of parliamentary immunity was restricted more 
and more towards the lack of juridical responsibility for the political opinions expressed during the political mandate 
and towards ensuring procedural warranties in case of criminal deeds during the political mandate. 
The Jurisprudence (Bucharest Court, 2013, p. 24) states that “the criminal investigation Institution was 
prohibited from performing a plenary analysis, when the decision of not leaving the country was taken, as per art. 
136 CPC, because of the invalidity of the procedural conditions with regards to the parliamentary immunity. 
However, from this perspective, this seems to be as an inequitable juridical treatment, by means of the measures 
taken between the CM-V and TAS accused and defending parties, under the conditions in which, given these 
reasons, the measure of preventive detention couldn’t be taken into account, all the more so when, as shown by the 
following – releasing the accused means quite a factual danger for the public order as compared to the arresting of 
the defendant”. 
In this respect we formulate a contrary opinion, considering that the immunity should be regarded not as 
impunity but as a way to perform the mandate. 
3. Opinions with Regards to the Necessity of Protection in Case of  Parliamentary Mandate 
The members of the representing central authorities (senators, deputies and the head of the State) benefit from 
immunity, having a special juridical status, with regards to following and indicting, in order to mainly protect 
themselves from possible upcoming baffles with regards to alienate them from their main mission of performing 
their function (Deaconu, 2007, pp. 160-161),  restricting the constitutional provisions in this matter leading to this 
principle’s lack of actual meaning. 
Due to the fact that the members of the Parliament are exposed by means of their functions, to certain attacks in 
the political field, and can also be victims of juridical errors, it is imposed that they benefit from additional 
warranties in what concerns the way in which the criminal investigation actions are performed. 
This point of view is maintained also in the specialized literature, under the conditions in which the 
parliamentary immunity doesn’t suppress the criminal repression, but only postpones the moment of sending to trial, 
of criminal follow-up or of criminal investigation. In other words, this is not considered to be a reason to exonerate 
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responsibility, and suppressing the juridical immunity is firmly opposed to the parliamentary democracy’s 
principles. 
Thus, according to some authors (Vrabie, 1999, p. 92, Turianu ,2012, p. 1, Gilia, 2009, p. 171) the inviolability 
doesn’t imply immunity because the criminal responsibility is not suppressed, but the moment in which the criminal 
investigation starts is only postponed, being considered a temporary action. The legislative power’s representative is 
thus protected in the opinions and votes expressed during his mandate guaranteed by the electors, but he is 
responsible as is any other citizen for the crimes which don’t have any connection with this mandate, the only 
accommodations accepted being procedural ones. 
We highlight the fact that the parliamentarian, as physical entity is not out of the scope of criminal legislations. 
We can state that the effects of immunity regard the persons that invested the parliamentarians with this function, as 
the people has to be certain that the elected one will represent their interests without restraints on behalf of the 
political competitors. 
Thus, one of the measures to protect people's representatives is the prohibition of detention, arrest or search of a 
deputy or senator, without prior consent of the Chamber that he is part of, the main reason for establishing this 
guarantee being the protection of parliamentarians’ against any kind of proceedings initiated against him biasedly 
and abusively. 
However, the Constitution assigns the Prosecutor's Office, attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, 
jurisdiction regarding criminal investigation and prosecution of a parliamentarian, and in the event that he shall be 
prosecuted, the High Court of Cassation and Justice has jurisdiction to judge the case, given the fact that it’s 
impartiality is at the highest level, presenting the ultimate guarantees of independence. 
It should be noted, however, that when the jurisdiction of the High Court of Cassation and Justice has been 
determined by the personal status of the defendant, a Senator or Deputy, and he has ceased to hold the office, and 
also the committed offense is unrelated to professional duties as a parliamentarian, High Court of Cassation and 
Justice has no jurisdiction to hear the case in the first instance. 
Furthermore the establishment of a jurisdiction based on personal status for legislators` is a potentially beneficial 
measure because member of the parliament are removed from the jurisdiction of the Court which would have 
jurisdiction according to the general rules, by sheltering them against judge’ s impartiality that could be impaired by 
relevant circumstances of the case, the personal status of the parties or any potential local adversities. 
In light of these considerations, we consider that eliminating or restricting the guarantees granted by immunity 
encourages political pressures and fabrications. In this context, there is the risk that elected representatives may not 
be able to exercise their mandate in accordance with their political beliefs or declared agenda. Therefore, this 
situation can be seen only as a transgression of the basic principles of democracy and constitutional state. 
Without an adecvate political protection, the way for abuses such representatives would be opened, with the 
consequence of the inability to effectively mandate. We appreciate that it such practices can not be encouraged, the 
sole purpose of the parliamentary immunity is that of preventing and deterring prosecution without legal grounds. 
Also, any politician would be able to eliminate a competing candidate by elaborating unjustified criminal 
complaints or by framing him, and given the very long duration of criminal cases, this may even entails removing 
the opponent from the political scene. However, given the media coverage of cases involving politicians, it could 
irrecoverably damage the image of a person against whom a criminal complaint was filed. Despite any presumption 
of innocence, in the public opinion, political representatives may remain with the stigma of a “prosecuted man”, 
even if the solution subsequently disposed by the investigators reveals his innocence. 
4. Aspects related to the procedure of lifting parliamentary immunity 
 
Constitutional provisions are consistent with the Statute of Deputies and Senators and those of the Chamber of 
Deputies, which provides detailed procedure for the waiver of parliamentary immunity in Articles 171-172, 
respectively 191-195. 
Parliamentary immunity is a legal guarantee to Deputies and Senators for the unhindered exercise of their 
mandate. Thus, it should not be construed as removing legal liability for violations of the laws committed by a 
member of the parliament, but as a protection against possible abuse or pressure. 
As regards the approval of the Chamber, stipulated in art. 72, Para. 2 of the Constitution, it is easily noticeable its 
exclusive political character. The debates in the Chamber about the approval of the application for detention, arrest 
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or search are not jurisdictional, the High Court of Cassation and Justice is the court that has full jurisdiction, being 
the only one that could determine the guilt or the innocence of parliamentarians (Ionescu, 2004, p 458). 
In case is sought initiation of criminal proceedings against a member of the executive power, but which is also a 
member of the parliament, the Chamber is expected to endorse the request for the initiation of prosecutions filed by 
the Minister of Justice. If the subject of criminal investigations is the Minister of Justice himself, in this case the 
request shall be made by the Prime Minister. 
This procedure for approval of the request by the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate shall be preceded by a 
report drawn by the permanent commission or a special committee of inquiry set up for this sole purpose, report that 
will have high priority on the Chamber` s debates agenda, activity that shall be done mandatory in the presence of 
the concerned parliamentarian. If he shall be indicted, he can, afterwards be searched, detained or arrested only with 
the consent of the Chamber, after prior hearing. 
In the report of the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of political and constitutional regime in Romania - 
to strengthen the constitutional state, it is alleged that the conversion of Assembly in a grand jury is wrongful, given 
that they can assess through special committees the case evidences. In this manner, legislators have the ability to 
convert a tool of protection into a weapon that blocks, arbitrarily, the path of justice in some cases. Mandate 
protection may not mean the enshrining of a formal inequality between citizens. 
Compared to these assertions, specialized literature opines otherwise (Gilia, 2009, page171). Commission that 
assesses the evidence is a specialized committee - Legal, Discipline and Immunities Committee - which consists 
usually of lawyers, therefore people who are trained to express an opinion and argue pertinently about any evidence 
submitted. Given that there were cases of waiver of parliamentary immunity, the allegation that immunity is a 
weapon blocking the path of justice is invalidated. 
The presumption of innocence is the ultimate guarantee for the equity of the act of justice and it should operate 
in favor of a member in the Parliament as it should function for every citizen. The protection conferred by the 
institution of parliamentary immunity, however, is inherently connected to membership of Parliament, losing the 
office resulting in inherent loss of immunity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Parliamentary immunity is therefore a constitutional institution, meant to protect the parliament against any 
repressive or arbitrary measures, which could be taken against them by the executive or the judicial power and thus 
undermining his independence. 
Analyzing the relevant legislation and judicial practice, we opine to the effect that this institution does not 
eliminate the liability of members of the Parliament and does not represent an issue of impunity, but represents a 
guarantee conferring them the opportunity to exercise their mandate in a climate of independence, without being 
under pressure of other external interference. In such circumstances, we consider that inviolability cannot be 
regarded as a privilege, but a special procedure for the protection of parliamentarians against unfair acts or deeds, or 
against insufficiently founded allegations. 
Given that criminal procedure is an activity that drags over time, aspect that may negatively influence the 
effective exercise of the legislative activity a member of the parliament carries on, we appreciate that certain 
legislative changes are absolutely necessary. To this end, we consider appropriate to establish normative provisions 
that conditions the initiation of criminal proceedings or the prosecution to the prior approval of the Chamber, a 
necessary measure not to be seen as a protection, but as a guarantee of accomplishment of the act of justice. 
In support of our proposal, we emphasize that as regards the liability of ministers, Romanian legislator intended 
to establish the condition of obtaining an opinion from the Chambers before beginning any criminal proceedings. 
Compared to such provisions, we consider that members of Parliament are required to have a similar legal protection 
as a procedural guarantee, capable of preserving the public interest. Thus, through the establishment of the 
procedural rules, members of Parliament can be sheltered from any baffles that would reflect upon exercise of public 
functions with which they have been invested and thus, the act of lawmaking. 
The role of parliament as an exponent of legislative power is, in addition to lawmaking to exert control over the 
executive, function that ensures the balance of powers. 
For this reason, we think it is even more important that members of parliament should be provided with 
sufficient safeguards during their mandate. Therefore, imposition of protective measures would prevent abuses from 
458   Mihaela Onofrei and Sandra Gradinaru /  Procedia Economics and Finance  20 ( 2015 )  453 – 459 
representatives of the Prosecutor's Office and the political interference in the judicial act, ensuring the full 
independence of Parliament and parliamentarians. One cannot appreciate that this would pursue to circumvent state 
laws or encourage irresponsibility, being obvious that members of parliament should be protected from such acts of 
unfair inquiry. 
In this context, we share the view of the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court, 2011), which argues that the 
removal of any of these forms of parliamentary immunity would result in directly suppression of any security 
measure regarding both the mandate of Houses and each parliamentarian, with serious impact on Parliament 
compliance to the extent of his constitutional role. 
Also, the Constitutional Court ruled that for the ministers or former ministers that are also parliamentarians to be 
required the authorization of the Chamber, to which they belong, for the initiation of prosecution (Constitutional 
Court, 2008). 
In addition, the European Court of Human Rights, in its case law, has ruled (ECHR, 2008) that parliamentary 
immunity is an institution that seeks a legitimate aim that of ensuring full independence of the parliamentarians and 
Parliament. Immunity has a character of public order, which requires that the judicial authorities are obliged to take 
it into account ex officio and any acts performed with its failure shall be automatically void. 
The European Court also held that immunity of parliamentarians [...] [has] the purpose of enabling them to 
attend constructively to the parliamentary debates and to represent the voters in matters of public interest by 
expressing and arguing freely their opinions without the risk of being prosecuted by a court or other authority. It is 
also revealed that immunity aims to a second legitimate purpose which is ordering relationships between the 
legislative and judicial powers (ECHR, 1996). 
Likewise, the European Court held that states granting immunity, more or less extensive, for the parliamentarians 
is a long-standing practice that aims to allow the free expression of the people` s representatives and should prevent 
a biased prosecution that could prejudice the parliamentary office (ECHR, 2003). 
Consequently, we consider as desirable the extension of legal protection within the meaning of seeking the 
approval of the Chamber not just in the case of eventual detention, arrest or search, but especially for situations in 
which prosecution might have criminal extent which can have a particularly strong impact on the activity of the 
investigated person. Prosecution engaged against a parliamentarian can affect the functioning of the Assembly and 
may even disrupt proper conduct of parliamentary proceedings. 
Moreover, we appreciate that the presumption of innocence should be reflected in the judgment of the Chamber 
regarding the waiver of parliamentary immunity, which involves only taking measures to pursue search, detention or 
arrest by the competent authorities. 
European legal framework reveals that the immunity is an important tool of the European Union, at a community 
level. Analysis of legislation regarding parliamentary immunity from different EU states emphasizes the urgent need 
to amend Romanian legislation for the purposes of widening the scope of parliamentary immunity - which 
represents a guardian of the independence of Deputies or Senators in exercise of their mandate - our suggestions 
being aligned with these prerogatives. 
In accordance with the European provisions that focus on protecting the elected representatives, we consider that 
is absolutely necessary an intervention of the national legislator for the purpose of requiring the approval of the 
Chambers in both cases, either opening an investigation or prosecuting the parliamentarian.  
In another perspective, we point out the fact that this protective measure is particularly important for the activity 
of parliament members, belonging to the opposition parties, which are often exposed to political harassment. 
We note that in the situation of parliamentarians there is no particular protection in the event of prosecution, or 
biased and abusive investigation, as a result of framing. The lack of guarantees may result in denigration and 
discrediting the image of the person concerned, which implicitly could involve removing him from the political life. 
Concluding, we emphasize that parliamentary immunity was designed as a defense of democratically elected 
representatives in the Parliament intended to protect their independence from external pressures and to guarantee 
freedom of expression and action in the process of carrying out their mandate. 
References 
Dăniúor, D. C., Constitutional Law and Political Institutions, General Theory, Treaty/Drept constituĠional úi instituĠii politice, Teoria generală, 
Tratat, Bucharest, C.H.Beck, 2007. 
459 Mihaela Onofrei and Sandra Gradinaru /  Procedia Economics and Finance  20 ( 2015 )  453 – 459 
Deaconu, S., Criminal liability of members of the Government, Law Magazine no. 1/2007/  Raspunderea penala a membrilor Guvernului, Revista 
Dreptul nr. 1/2007. 
Deleanu, I., Institutions and constitutional procedures - in the Romanian and comparative law/InstituĠii úi proceduri constituĠionale - în dreptul 
român úi în dreptul comparat, Bucharest, C.H. Beck, 2006. 
Gilia, C., Reforming the Romanian constitutional system - a priority?, Romanian law studies magazine no. 2/2009/ Reformarea sistemului 
constituĠional românesc – o prioritate?, Revista studii de drept romanesc nr. 2/2009, [Online] at http://www.rsdr.ro/Art-3-2-2009, viewed at 
5.12.2012. 
Iancu, G., 2007. Constitutional Law and Political Institutions, Fifth Editionrevised and supplemented/Drept constituĠional úi instituĠii politice, 
EdiĠia a V-a revizuită úi completată, Bucharest, Lumina Lex. 
Muraru, I. úi Tănăsescu, E. S., 2006.Constitutional Law and political institutions/Drept constituĠional úi instituĠii politice, Bucureúti, Bucharest, 
C.H. Beck. 
Popescu, R. D., 2011. Parliament Liability in constitutional law – Abstract/Răspunderea Parlamentului în dreptul constituĠional-rezumatul tezei 
de doctorat, Bucharest. 
Turianu, C., 2012. It is possible to „waver” parliamentary immunity?/Este posibila “ridicarea” imunităĠii parlamentare? [Online] at 
http://corneliuturianu.blogspot.ro/2012/08/este-posibila-ridicarea-imunitatii.html, viewed at 27.12.2012. 
Turianu, C., 2012.  Parliamentary immunity/Imunitatea parlamentară, [Online] at  http:// www.amosnews.ro/ imunitatea-parlamentara,  viewed at 
10.12.2012. 
Turianu, C., 2012. Parliamentary inviolability ("procedural immunity")/Inviolabilitatea parlamentară („imunitatea procedurală”)/, [Online] at 
http:// corneliuturianu.blogspot.ro/2012/08/inviolabilitatea-parlamentara.html, viewed at 21.12.2012. 
Vrabie, G., Constitutional Law and Political Institutions /Drept constituĠional úi instituĠii politice, Iaúi, Cugetarea, 1999. 
Constitutional Court, Decision no. 270 of 10.03.2008, published in the Official Journal, Part I no. 290 of 15.04.2008/Curtea ConstituĠională, 
Decizia nr. 270 din 10.03.2008, publicată în Monitorul Oficial, Partea I nr. 290 din 15.04.2008. 
Constitutional Court, Decision no. 799 of 17 June 2011, published in Official Journal no. 440 of 23 June 2011/Curtea ConstituĠională, Decizia nr. 
799 din 17 iunie 2011, publicată în Monitorul Oficial nr. 440 din 23 iunie 2011. 
European Court of Human Rights, Cordova v. Italy (no. 2) judgment of January 30, 2003/Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului, cauza Cordova 
v. Italia (nr.2) hotararea din 30 ianuarie 2003, [Online] at http://www.constcourt.md., viewed at 25.01.2013. 
European Court of Human Rights, Kart v. Turkey, judgment of 8 July 2008/Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului, cauza Kart contra Turciei, 
hotărârea din 8 iulie 2008, [Online] at www.jurisprudenĠacedo.com, viewed at 12.01.2013. 
European Court of Human Rights, Young v. Ireland, judgment of 17 January 1996/Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului, cauza Young contra 
Irlandei, hotărârea din 17 ianuarie 1996, [Online] at http://www.constcourt.md, viewed at 22.01.2012. 
Presidential Commission for the Analysis of political and constitutional regime in Romania, to strengthen the constitutional state/Comisia 
PrezidenĠială de Analiză a Regimului Politic úi ConstituĠional din România, Pentru consolidarea statului de drept, [Online] at 
http://www.presidency.ro/ static/ordine/CPARPCR/Raport_CPARPCR, viewed at 29.11.2012. 
Regulation for the Chamber of Deputies, Chapter IV - Statute of Deputies, Section I/Regulamentul Camerei DeputaĠilor, Capitolul IV – Statutul 
Deputatului, SecĠiunea  I. 
Bucharest Tribunal, Criminal Second Section, Hearing Notes, dated 29.11.2012 in case no. 45462/3/2012/Tribunalul Bucureúti, secĠia a II a 
penală, Încheiere de úedinĠă din data de 29.11.2012, în dosarul nr. 45462/3/2012.  
 
 
